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1.  Introduction 
Quality change (including new products) poses considerable problems to agencies responsible for 
elaborating the CPI in every country. The Boskin et a1.  (1996) Senate commission concluded that the 
CPI in the US overstates the true inflation by 0.61 % a year due to a failure on the part of the BLS 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics) to take fully into account the quality changes experienced in many sectors 
of the economy and to consider in a timely fashion the value of newly available goods to consumers. 
This paper assesses the conjecture raised by some critics of the Boskin commission's report that 
new  products  and  goods  influenced  by  quality  effects  are  disproportionately  consumed  by  the 
rich-see, e.g.,  Deaton  (1998),  and Madrick (1997).  Moreover,  the  distributional  consequences of 
eliminating the QCB  are examined by the QCB  impact on two scalars:  (1) the CPI plutocratic gap, 
and (2) the change in money inequality. 
In order to study the distributional implications of the QCB, a set of household-specific CPIs is 
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needed. Such infonnation is not readily available for the US  economy. However, for the Spanish case 
it is  possible to  construct Laspeyres price indexes for  all  households  interviewed in the  three  latest 
budget household surveys (1973-1974, 1980-1981, and  1990-1991). In this paper it is assumed that 
the structure of the QCB provided by  the Boskin commission-appropriately modified after a careful 
reading of the arguments advanced by its critics in the BLS, and further adjusted to the peculiarities of 
the  Spanish economy--can be reasonably applied to  Spain. 
2.  The quality-change bias in the US  and Spanish economies 
The CPI can be written as the weighted average of goods price ratios: CPIt = 2: i  W; (Pi/PiO)' where 
W;  is  the  aggregate  share  of the  expenditure  on  good  i  in  total  expenditure.  Assume  that  quality 
change  has  not  been  completely  eliminated  from  the  price  ratios  (Pi/PiO)'  and  let  hi  be  the  best 
estimate of the QCB in the measurement of inflation of good i expressed in percent per year. Then the 
QCB  for the  economy  as  a whole is  given by  QCB = 2:i  W; hi' Column  1 of Table  1 presents  the 
weights W;  of the 27 categories (used by the Boskin Commission) in the US CPI in December 1995, 
column  2  lists  the  commission  estimates  of the  QCB  in  each  case.  Moulton  and  Moses  (1997) 
contains  detailed and  convincing criticisms  of the Boskin commission estimates.  In particular,  they 
point out that in nine categories (1,  2,  3,  8,  10,  14,  20,  25,  and  27), in the absence of evidence, the 
commission  is  forced  to  fall  back  simply  on  their  best judgement.  This  group  accounts  for  0.11 
percentage points of the total QCB. Following these arguments, the QCB  of motor fuel  (category 20) 
is  reduced  to  0.15,  and  those  of the  remaining  categories  in  this  group  are  reduced  by  one-half. 
Column  3  lists  the  QCB  estimates  after  these  corrections.  Columns  4  to  6  contain  the  aggregate 
weights, W;,  for the  Spanish economy. 
It could be  argued  that the  dynamic  nature  of the  US  economy is  characterized by  more  quality 
changes and the  appearance  of new  products  than what we  should  expect in the  Spanish economy. 
However,  the  Spanish  statistical  agency  is  much  less  active  than  the  BLS  in  eliminating  quality 
change from price variation. Therefore, in this  paper it is  assumed that,  as  a first approximation, the 
structure of the  QCB  for the  US  (Table  1,  column 3) can be  applied to  the  Spanish economy.  The 
advantage of accepting this assumption is twofold:  (i) we can study how our estimates of the QCB in 
Spain are  affected by changes over time in the aggregate weights, and (ii) we can assess whether the 
QCB  is  more pronounced for the rich or the poor Spanish households in different moments in time. 
In order to compare the structure of the QCB in the US  and the Spanish economies, it is  advisable 
to reduce the dimensionality of the commodity space. Column 1 of Table 2 presents the contribution 
of each of seven large expenditure groups to the overall QCB in the US. Column 2 provides the same 
infonnation for the US, but for the corrected QCB structure which is  applied to Spain. Columns 3 to 5 
provide the contribution of the seven groups to the overall QCB in Spain in 1990-1991, 1980-1981, 
and  1973-1974, respectively. 
The total QCB  in the  US  economy  in  1995  was  initially estimated at  0.61 % per year. When  the 
weight of household appliances is modified from 2.13% to the lower weight of 0.806% so that weights 
add  to  1 (see  note a  in  Table  2 of Boskin et al.,  1996)  the  QCB  becomes  0.58%  per year. If the 
corrections included in column 3 of Table 1 are accepted for the US,  then the QCB  is  further reduced 
to 0.55% per year. In comparison, the QCB in Spain in 1990-1991 is estimated to be 0.41 % per year. 
Since the QCB for all expenditure categories has been taken to  be the same in the two countries, the 
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Table 1 
The quality  change bias in the US,  and the US vs.  Spanish aggregate weight structure in percentage terms 
US CPI  US  QCB  Spanish CPI weights 
weights 
Original  Corrected  1990-1991  1980-1981  1973-1974 
I.  Food, beverages and  tobacco 
1.  Food at  home  8.54  0.30  0.15  20.73  26.23  31.87 
2.  Fresh fruits  and vegetables  1.34  0.60  0.30  3.02  3.80  4.01 
3.  Alcoholic beverages  1.57  0.15  0.075  0.93  1.44  2.11 
4.  Tobacco  1.61  0.00  0.00  1.51  1.17  1.52 
Il. Apparel  and shoes 
5.  Apparel and shoes  5.52  1.00  1.00  9.66  8.67  7.70 
Ill. Housing 
6.  Shelter  28.29  0.25  0.25  19.83  16.14  12.01 
7.  Fuels  3.79  0.00  0.00  2.76  1.51  1.47 
8.  Other utilities, incl.  telephone  3.22  1.00  0.50  1.63  2.52  2.05 
IV.  Household equip.  and serv. 
9.  Appliances  2.13  3.60  3.60  0.97  1.28  0.89 
10.  House furnishings  2.64  0.30  0.15  1.82  2.14  2.68 
11.  Housekeeping supplies  1.12  0.00  0.00  1.97  3.34  3.40 
12.  Housekeeping services  1.48  0.00  0.00  0.91  0.89  1.15 
V.  Medical care 
13.  Prescription drugs  0.89  2.00  2.00  0.49  0.66  1.20 
14. Non prescription drugs and medical supplies  0.39  1.00  0.5  0.56  0.33  0.08 
15.  Professional medical services  3.47  3.00  3.00  1.17  0.99  0.43 
16.  Hospital services  2.26  3.00  3.00  0.11  0.09  0.50 
17.  Health insurance  0.36  0.00  0.00  0.29  0.33  0.44 
VI.  Transportation 
18.  New vehicles  5.03  0.59  0.59  4.09  3.33  2.42 
19.  Used vehicles  1.34  1.59  1.59  0.00  0.00  0.00 
20.  Motor fuel  2.91  0.25  0.15  3.43  4.13  2.51 
21.  Other private transportation  6.15  0.00  0.00  4.05  4.11  1.99 
22.  Public transportation  1.52  0.00  0.00  1.12  1.40  1.89 
VII and VIII.  Other goods and  services 
23.  Commodities  1.98  2.00  2.00  3.21  2.28  1.78 
24.  Services  2.39  0.00  0.00  2.34  2.89  5.37 
25.  Food away  5.89  0.30  0.15  8.76  5.85  6.16 
26.  Personal care  1.17  0.90  0.90  1.80  1.68  2.13 
27.  Personal and  educational expenses  4.34  0.20  0.10  2.83  2.79  2.24 
Total  100  0.61  0.55  100  100  100 
differences between columns 2 (US) and 3 (Spain) in Table 2 are exclusively due to the differences in 
aggregate weights. The contribution to the overall QCB by expenditure groups I,  II and VII is larger 
in Spain. Given the much smaller role of the public health system in the US, relative to a country like 
Spain where most of the health expenditures correspond to the public sector, the contribution of group 
V to  the  QCB  is  larger in the US  by  0.14 percentage points per year.  This, together with the 0.10 
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Table 2 
The quality-change bias in the US  and Spain 
US  bias  Corrected Spanish bias 
Original  Corrected  1990-1991  1980-1981  1973-1974 
I  Food,  beverages and tobacco  0.04  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.06 
11  Apparel and  shoes  0.06  0.06  0.10  0.09  0.08 
III  Housing  0.10  0.09  0.06  0.05  0.04 
IV  Household equipment and services  0.08  0.08  0.04  0.05  0.04 
V  Medical care  0.19  0.19  0.05  0.05  0.05 
VI  Transportation  0.06  0.06  0.03  0.03  0.02 
VII  Other goods and  services  0.08  0.06  0.10  0.07  0.07 
Aggregate Bias  0.61  0.55  0.41  0.39  0.35 
percentage points attributable to the remaining groups Ill, IV;  and VI, explains the difference between 
the US  QCB and the Spanish one. On the other hand, the relative importance of 'apparel' and 'other 
goods  and services'  (groups II  and  VII)  and,  above all,  of 'housing'  (group Ill), is  monotonically 
decreasing in Spain as  we delve further into the past. Except for food,  beverages and tobacco (group 
I),  which consists mainly of necessities  and whose weight declines  as  household total expenditures 
increase  over time  in  real  terms,  the  remaining  groups  IV;  V;  and  VI  have  weights  which  remain 
essentially constant over time.  Consequently,  the  QCB,  in percent per year,  increases  from  0.35  in 
1973-1974, to  0.39 in  1980-1981 and 0.41  in  1990-1991.
1 
Finally, Table 3 presents the QCB  by  decile of the total  household expenditures distribution.  As 
Table 3 
The QCB by decile of the household total expenditures distribution 
Decile  Quality-change bias 
QI 91-Jan 98  QI 81-QI 91  73174-Q181 
1  0.310  0.308  0.277 
2  0.346  0.340  0.307 
3  0.361  0.361  0.319 
4  0.374  0.363  0.323 
5  0.393  0.382  0.328 
6  0.403  0.374  0.335 
7  0.410  0.388  0.342 
8  0.417  0.397  0.339 
9  0.428  0.401  0.349 
10  0.446  0.399  0.345 
Total  0.409  0.386  0.346 
Percentage points per year. 
I Assuming the uncorrected Boskin commission QCB structure in column 2 of Table 1, the bias in the Spanish case would 
be raised to  0.48, 0.47, and 0.44% per year in  1990-1991, 1980-1981, and  1973-1974, respectively, in comparison with 
0.61 % per year in the US. 
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conjectured, richer households are significantly more affected by the QCB--e.g. the QCB for the top 
decile is between 25  and 45%  larger than for the bottom decile, depending on the household survey. 
3.  Distributional aspects of eliminating the QCB in the Spanish economy 
3.1.  Effects on the plutocratic gap 
The official CPI can also be expressed as  a weighted average of the household-specific CPIs with 
weights proportional to household total expenditures. Because the rich households weight more than 
the poor households, the CPI has been called a plutocratic price index (Prais, 1958). Let us define the 
household-specific quality change bias by b
h 
=  2,;w7bi• Then we have that the QCB for the economy 
as  a whole is  the plutocratic weighted average of the household-specific quality biases. 
In Izquierdo et al.  (2002) the plutocratic gap (PG) is defined as the difference in the measurement 
of inflation when the plutocratic CPI is used rather than a (democratic) group price index in which all 
households have the same weight. The PG is positive or negative according to whether prices behave 
relatively more in an anti-rich or anti-poor manner, respectively. The individual price index after the 
correction for the QCB  is  simply cpi:O - b
h
). Thus,  whether new products  and goods  affected by 
quality effects are disproportionately consumed by the rich households can be ascertained by whether 
or not the PG magnitude declines after the elimination of the  QCB. 
Household-specific price indexes  are  constructed using the last three  Spanish household surveys, 
and the PG is  estimated for Winter  1991-January 1998, Winter  1981-Winter 1991,  and  1973174-
Winter 1981.  The results,  reported in Izquierdo et al.  (2002), are that the overall PG in these three 
periods was equal to  0.055,  0.091,  and 0.265%  per year,  respectively.  This  means  that in all  three 
periods  the  inflation experienced by the  richer households  has  been relatively greater than the  one 
experienced by  the  poorer households.  Thus,  prices  have behaved,  with  different intensities,  in an 
anti-rich way. 
As Table 4 shows, when the PG is computed in the three periods in terms of the indexes in which 
the  QCB  has  been eliminated,  it  is  equal  to  0.035,  0.073  and 0.249%  per year,  respectively.  This 
means that 36.4, 19.8 and 6.0% of the PG could be attributed to the QCB. Thus, in the three cases the 
conjecture that this phenomenon is more prevalent among the rich households appears to be supported 
by the facts. Furthermore, the fact that the further we move into the past the smaller is the decline in 
Table 4 
The plutocratic gap in  Spain:  before  and after the correction for  the quality-change bias 
Before correcting for the QCB 
After correcting for the  QCB 
Change 
Plutocratic gap 
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the PG as  a result of the  elimination of the  QCB,  is  consistent with  the  fact  that household total 
expenditures in real  terms decline as  well when moving in that direction. 
3.2.  The  effect on  the  change in  income inequality 
Consider  the  household  income  or  expenditures  distributions  in  two  different  time  periods, 
XI = (x:, . .. ,  x7) and  x2 = (x~, ... ,  x~\ where  x~ represents  household  h's total  expenditures  in 
period t.  Let P I  and P2  be the price vectors in the two situations. Household h total expenditures in 
situation 1 can be expressed at prices P2'  X~.2' by multiplying her original money income in period 1, 
h  b  ..  1  ..  d  fth  L  h  h(  hi  h)  h  h  h  xi'  Y a statistica  pnce ill ex 0  e  aspeyres type: XI.2 = PI' ql  P2' ql PI . ql  =  P2 . qp were ql 
is  the bundle consumed by household h in period  1.  Let  ~ be an  inequality index,  the  change in 
money income inequality, dM, can be expressed as  the  sum of two terms: 
The term M  = ~(X2) - ~(XI.2) is the change in real income inequality while AP =  ~(x1,2) - ~(XI) 
captures  the  distributional  impact  of price  changes  on  inequality  measurement  according  to  the 
first-period households' choices. When price changes are anti-rich and PG is positive (as is the case in 
Spain during the period considered), the term D.P  is positive. In this case, if M>  0 then dM would 
indicate a lower decrease in real income inequality; if,  however, M  < 0 then dM would indicate a 
larger increase in real income inequality. On the other hand, if new products and goods affected by 
quality effects are disproportionately consumed by the rich households (as  the results in the previous 
subsection suggest), then the term D.P  should be lower after the elimination of the QCB. 
Following Buhmann et al.  (1988), let  y(O)  denote the  distribution of equivalent household  total 
expenditures with /(0) = xh(l)-e, and 0 E [0,  1]. Denote by J.L(Y(O»  the mean of the distribution of 
y(O),  define z\O) = y\O)/J.L(Y(O»,  and let z(O)  be the corresponding distribution of z"(O). 
To verify whether the term D.P  is  positive in the three periods, an inequality index of equivalent 
household expenditures must be computed. Members of the Generalized Entropy family  are chosen 
because they are the only measures of relative inequality that satisfy the usual normative properties 
and,  in  addition,  are  decomposable  by  population  subgroups  (Shorrocks,  1984).  The  Generalized 
Entropy  family  can be  described by  the  following  convenient cardinalization:  ~c(z(O» = (1  - lIH 
~z\On/(c(1 - c», when c ¥- 0,  1.  For c = 0, define  ~o(z(O» = 1 IH ~ In z\O), so that the index is 
the  mean  logarithmic  deviation.  For c = 1,  define  ~I  (z( 0»  =  11 H  ~ z\  0)  In  z\  0),  which  is  the 
original  Theil  index.  The  parameter  c  summarizes  the  sensitivity  of  ~c in  different  parts  of the 
household total expenditures distribution: the more positive (negative) c is, the more sensitive  ~c is to 
differences at the top (bottom) of the distribution (Cowell and Kuga,  1981). 
Table 5 presents  the estimates for  D.Pc(O),  expressed in percentage terms  of  ~(XI)' for  different 
combinations  of the  parameter  values  (c,  0).  These  estimates  have  been  computed  using  1000 
Bootstrap stratified (re)samples. Firstly, as expected, D.Pc(O) is positive for all values of c and 0 in the 
three panels of Table 5.  However,  in line  with  the  size of the plutocratic gap in the  three periods 
(0.055, 0.091, and 0.265% per year, respectively), the distributional impact of the change in relative 
prices is between 2-5%, 4-9%, and 6-14% in 1991-1998, 1981-1991, and 1973-1981, respectively. 
Secondly,  the  correction  of the  QCB  gives  rise  to  a  statistically  significant  decrease  in  such  a 
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Table 5 
Changes in  expenditure inequality before and  after the  correction by the  quality change bias 
Before correcting for QCB  After correcting for  QCB 
c=  -1  o  2  -1  o  2 
Percentage change in inequality from  1991  to  1998  after compensating for  price changes 
8 =  0  2.43  2.06  2.36  3.1 5  1.60  1.49  1.86  2.48 
(0.162)  (0.126)  (0.210)  (0.606)  (0.182)  (0.161)  (0.298)  (0.935) 
8 = 0.5  3.20  2.97  3.27  4.10  2.22  2.26  2.61  3.33 
(0.169)  (0.151)  (0.251)  (0.673)  (0.192)  (0.191)  (0.346)  (0.999) 
8 =  1  3.30  3.24  3.68  5.02  2.43  2.60  3.16  4.48 
(0.167)  (0.154)  (0.251)  (0.624)  (0.186)  (0.185)  (0.314)  (0.819) 
Percentage change in inequality from  1981  to  1991  after compensating for  price changes 
8 = 0  4.39  4.18  5.1 I  7.63  3.63  3.75  4.87  7.60 
(0.167)  (0.135)  (0.196)  (0.408)  (0.188)  (0.157)  (0.236)  (0.506) 
8 = 0.5  4.75  4.82  5.95  8.95  3.91  4.27  5.63  9.03 
(0.180)  (0.170)  (0.263)  (0.727)  (0.210)  (0.200)  (0.320)  (0.905) 
8 = 1  3.95  4.14  5.40  9.35  3.23  3.64  5.14  9.79 
(0.192)  (0.197)  (0.357)  (1.486)  (0.236)  (0.235)  (0.438)  (1.866) 
Percentage change in inequality from  1973  to  1981  after compensating for  price changes 
8 = 0  9.28  6.91  7.50  10.25  8.80  6.57  7.20  9.80 
(1.349)  (0.186)  (0.276)  (0.621)  (1.475)  (0.186)  (0.272)  (0.569) 
8 = 0.5  11.05  9.07  9.78  13.02  10.46  8.62  9.38  12.51 
(1.070)  (0.254)  (0.419)  (0.956)  (1.169)  (0.254)  (0.415)  (0.926) 
8 = 1  10.79  9.14  9.94  14.02  10.21  8.68  9.55  13.66 
(0.654)  (0.291)  (0.510)  (1.272)  (0.709)  (0.291)  (0.506)  (1.252) 
Bootstrap standard errors in  parentheses. 
distributional effect.  For c = 0 and  ()  ::= 0.5,  for instance,  this  decrease amounts to  a 24,  12  and  5% 
reduction of the term APo(0.5) in  each of the three periods. 
4.  Conclusions 
This paper investigates the conjecture raised by some critics of the Boskin commission's report that 
new  products  and  goods  influenced by quality  effects  are disproportionately consumed by the rich. 
Firstly, the results  presented here confirm that the richer households indeed experience significantly 
more  QCB.  Secondly, the plutocratic  gap  (which has been positive in Spain  1973-1998) decreases 
substantially after the elimination of the QCB. Furthermore, the greater the overall QCB, the greater 
the reduction in the plutocratic gap. Thirdly, since prices have displayed an anti-rich behavior during 
1973-1998 in  Spain,  the  cost-of-living  adjustment  should  be greater  for  richer  households.  As  a 
result,  after compensating for these price changes, equivalent household-expenditures inequality will 
increase.  However,  since  the  QCB  affects  predominantly  the  richer households,  this  distributional 
effect diminishes once the QCB  is  eliminated. 
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